The threat of forking a blockchain project is a catalyst for cooperation, which means that there are many parallels between the blockchain and open source development dynamics. It also means that the value of a blockchain project comes more from a vibrant ecosystem of participants who are exchanging value with each other.
There are many new cryptoeconomic primitives that are pointing towards gift economy and “yin currency” dynamics where the more that you give away, then the more that you get.
- Will there be new economic behaviors that are revealed through the unique blend of Tech, Law, Culture, & Markets?
- Do the economics of cryptocurrency tokens allow for a more equitable redistribution of wealth?
- What’s a more sustainable method for funding and cultivating open source software development?
- And can you actually get more value with the more value that you give away?
These are all questions that Joseph Poon is setting out to answer through a number of experiments with his new Handshake.org project just recently announced.
I had a chance to talk to Poon at the Decentralized Web Summit about some of the theory and philosophical concepts that he’s exploring around coordination mechanisms, group dynamics, and collective action decisions. He’s exploring how technology (algorithms & code) works in relationship to human incentives (economic market), social dynamics (culture), & coordinating group dynamics (governance models).
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[00:00:05.452] Kent Bye: The Voices of VR Podcast. Hello, my name is Kent Bye, and welcome to the Voices of VR Podcast. So one of the biggest open questions that I was really investigating at the Decentralized Web Summit was, are some of these blockchain technologies going to change some of the fundamental and underlying rules of our economy and how we relate to each other? And my sense is that there is some things that are going to be completely different when it comes to virtualized economies, economies that are based upon algorithms and code and people collaborating with each other, where at any moment they can fork that off and be able to take it off on their own. And so you're changing the dynamics of zero-sum game competition and encouraging people to cooperate and collaborate with each other in new and different ways. And this is something that is fundamentally different than what we've had before. And so Wendy Hanamura, she was one of the architects of the Decentralized Web Summit, she had pointed out to me that I should really check out what Joseph Poon had to say with some of the research and experiments that he's planning on starting to conduct within the blockchain community. So Joseph Poon is somebody who is a researcher on scalability, he's the co-author of the Lightning Network and Plasma. And he's currently looking at things like coordination mechanisms, and group dynamics, and collective action decisions. All these things around how are the technology, and these algorithms, and the codes, are they going to change our relationship to human incentives, which is the market dynamics. and change the social dynamics, which is the culture and the values embedded into their different decisions, and coordinating group dynamics, which is a form of governance model within the blockchain, which is kind of equivalent to the normal laws that we have within our society. And how are all these things going to come together and be able to create these new dynamics within these nonprofit entities that look like natural monopolies, but they're really encouraging all this collaboration and cooperation? So inspired by these gift economy concepts of trying to really seed content and value within a community by giving away free coins of the cryptocurrency through faucets and airdrops, and that's one of the mechanisms that Joseph's going to be talking about, but In terms of the blockchain, it's all about cultivating an ecosystem and getting lots of people to collaborate and participate on a common protocol, and you have this coopetition dynamic. And so Joseph's really trying to model as much as he can, but also just run some real-world experiments, because when it comes down to human incentives, there's nothing like actually having a stake in the game and being able to see what people actually do when it's live. And so they're doing some live experiments to experiment with some of these concepts. I'll be talking about Joseph Poon about, you know, these gift economies and this dynamics of coopetition on today's episode of the Voices of VR podcast. So this interview with Joseph happened on Thursday, August 2nd, 2018 at the Decentralized Web Summit in San Francisco, California. So with that, let's go ahead and dive right in.
[00:03:00.648] Joseph Poon: I'm Joseph Hoon, I'm principally a researcher within the blockchain space dealing with scalability. So I've been known for co-authoring the Lightning Network paper as well as Plasma on Ethereum. Both of those are mechanisms around increasing throughput on the blockchain. Both of those are community-wide efforts where everybody is doing a lot of good work. But my current area of research is around coordination and collective action problems. And I think when you do deal with decentralization, there's a problem of how do you effectively decentralize something and get it worldwide use with these decentralized systems. And I think the observation that the blockchain space has been making around the impetus for the need for the blockchain itself has been around the notion of Sybil attacks, S-Y-B-I-L. And these types of Sybil attacks make it so that people tend to create trusted central authorities. Instead of Usenet, we have Reddit. Instead of everybody running their own email server due to spam, We have Gmail becoming popular. Instead of you running your own infrastructure or you having directories, well the directories get corrupted so you have centralized directories such as Facebook and things like that. And how do you get around that problem and effectively decentralize things? And the argument is that the blockchain is able to do decentralization. by having a single central actor that has decentralized control. So that it's this entity that is able to constrain spamming, resource constraints, and assignment of scarce resources, but isn't really controlled or owned by anyone. As a consequence of this shift towards decentralization and this model, which is effectively how the blockchain works, there's a question of control and ownership and governance and development. A lot of companies do development by raising money from venture capital and hiring engineers, using that valuation for stock options and then growing by creating centralized institutions, and they're very effective, and I would argue exist for a reason. If one wants to decentralize those institutions, you sort of have to understand why they work from a mechanism perspective, from a corporate mechanism perspective, from a business process perspective. And if you wanted to replace those, you have to understand what you are replacing. And I would argue what you are replacing and how you would replace it is creating this sort of incentive game of wide distribution, because the past 20 years with Silicon Valley, it's been raise a bunch of money and distribute it out. And I think, you know, Silicon Valley, I think will persist, but I think the nature will change dramatically. I think, you know, late stage financing could end up getting disrupted under the structure whereby you distribute out coins and value of the blockchain. to the people that will be developing it, to the people that will be using it, and ultimately wider humanity, optimistically as a gift without any expectation of return. And it's done as a gift without any expectation of direct return, irrespective of game theoretic tit-for-tat dynamics, that this can be done without any central authority when the platform is launched long-term. Now, obviously, development oftentimes does require individuals to develop things and that creates some types of authority. But ideally, that stuff can be decentralized long term as well. Yeah, at this conference, it's very interesting because, you know, it's not just about technology, it's about technology, its relationships with human incentives, and its relationship with social dynamics and group dynamics. And how do you coordinate these group dynamics with things that look like natural monopolies?
[00:06:53.229] Kent Bye: Yeah, it sounds like that usually the existing system is that a company will raise VC cash they'll be able to hire developers to be able to build something and then go to market and then with ICO you have the potential to raise money from the general public you have these coins that at that point are just kind of speculative in that they may be adding more value later but that may be a way to kind of infuse real money into actually funding a lot of this development and so we have that as it's sort of a changing of the dynamic of the funding but I'm trying to get a sense of the gift economy dynamics here because I know that Charles Eisenstein has a book called Sacred Economics and one of the things that he says is that there's a difference between a friendship and a community versus things that you're paying for. He says anytime that you exchange money you're saying this relationship is over. this exchange of value of this money is saying that I no longer need you. And that by having the gift, there's a spirit of community that can get cultivated by that. But I'm just trying to figure out how that actually plays out in terms of that gift economy with no expectation. How does that sort of fit into this larger ecosystem? And how does that playing out?
[00:07:55.947] Joseph Poon: Well, a lot of those research and texts define gifts as have self-interested components to it. And oftentimes those self-interested components are social, and it's important to recognize that. I think the expectation is that this is about alignment of incentives, first and foremost, and that it's a concurrent game played with capitalism and operates much like capitalism, but in the opposite way, right? Capitalism is, you know, I lower my own prices out of my own self-interest because I think I'll make more money that way, right? And that's sort of the idealistic view of capitalism. If there's competitors. Right. If there's competitors and some markets are naturally monopolistic, and there's weird complexity dynamics around that. But in commodities markets, that's sort of how it looks like. In economies markets, sort of the ideal, instead of having one person determine how much food to produce next year, you have the markets and everyone's self-interested to lower their own prices as a consequence. Commensurately, I think there's an emerging game evolving in the blockchain space via mechanisms such as airdrops and faucets, whereby it is in your own self-interest to distribute out more value, as much as possible, given the competitive dynamics of other projects. So imagine if six months from now, there's like three VPN blockchain projects, or mesh network projects, you know, assume there's three internet sharing projects six months from now, and Let's say they're all equally viable, and let's say they mostly have the same technology. One of them elects to give away more value to developers, users, and wider humanity. I would argue out of those three, the one that gives away more value has greater odds of success, given developer constraints. Given the nature of the blockchain space and the ease of forking, meaning that you can take an existing blockchain, take all the code and replicate it on your own, and you could elect unilaterally to fork the code and give away the majority of value to humanity. There's nothing stopping people from competitively distributing out value as much as possible to wider humanity.
[00:10:03.603] Kent Bye: When you say competitively give out value, are you talking about like a specific cryptocurrency coin? And then when you say to humanity, is it to anybody in the world or the specific developer community? I kind of understand this as like, hey, let's say you're working on Bitcoin, for example, and that the developers get some Bitcoins, but that, you know, there's already an exchange rate for this, but it seems like Some of these projects may not have things on an exchange rate. Does that mean that it's sort of like a stock option for somebody at a startup where it doesn't have any value until you actually have an IPO? This would be kind of the equivalent where you have a coin before it has an ICO.
[00:10:37.972] Joseph Poon: So this is an interesting question of how do you replicate these dynamics of growth, right? You know, having developers is sort of like normally it's done within a company and things like that. The example that I would give is that there is still a role for investors, but I think that a lot of the whole public ICO narrative may decline dramatically long-term. I think the reputation around capital has significant influence. And I think that needs to be recognized. And I'm not ascribing good or bad, but it just needs to be recognized. And I think what you will probably see the ecosystem do, and I'm guessing here, is that people raise a small amount, probably somewhere between 5 and 20 percent of the total coin supply with investors. And there probably would be prominent investors rather than random people. And those people are attaching the reputation to the project with capital. to sort of like, you know, skin in the game type of thing, in order to attach some type of gatekeeping function in terms of attention, right? Otherwise, there'd be a hundred thousand projects clamoring for attention, and ultimately, like crabs in a bucket, none of them succeed. There tends to need to be reputational systems, and one of those functions that investors will provide long-term is probably going to be a pricing function, in the fact that they pre-buy the token for a specific price, so now there's a valuation attached to it, And it needs to be somewhere between 5% and 20% because if you go below 5%, then it's not credible, you know, the amount they paid. You know, so it needs to be somewhere, my guess is somewhere in that range. Maybe it's higher, but like, I think 5% is probably a lower bound. They have a pricing attached to it so that when they distribute out the value, there's an understanding of what it is people are getting.
[00:12:23.503] Kent Bye: So maybe just as a metaphor, just so I understand what this is saying at a large scale, is that usually you may have a CEO who takes a huge amount of money for getting paid. It'd be kind of metaphorically if that CEO took his salary and kind of distributed it out, but rather than the actual money or the salary, it's kind of like these coins that he's giving out in order to say, hey, in order for you to work on this project that is already have value and it's already established and has a reputation and is actually doing good in the world, you're going to have some stake in the game by actually having some coins in that the projects that do that are then going to be more successful. Is that your argument?
[00:12:58.401] Joseph Poon: Yes. And I think this is unique to the cryptocurrency space because of the ease of forking and the ease of replication. You cannot do this with for-profit corporations, this model. simply because that company has a CEO, a board, and infrastructure. And it's going to be somewhat centralized, and you cannot easily replicate those network effects and replicate those individuals. With a blockchain, if it's fully decentralized, i.e. it's this thing that just runs, Nothing is stopping you from forking the code base, making your own, and then competitively distributing out value. This is the step function change that the blockchain has allowed people to do. It's the fact that it's decentralized, that it doesn't rely upon reputation of the individuals long term, and it doesn't rely on those infrastructure because everything is code. As a consequence, there's nothing stopping forking. There's nothing stopping this competitive dynamic to be amped up to 11.
[00:13:54.935] Kent Bye: I come from the open source community where forking was kind of seen as something of a last resort option. Is this something that you see the forking as sort of like something that actually instills a sort of inherent competition within, but being able to replicate the value and be able to just say, I'm going to sort of take this and the licensing for all that just makes sense and it still works?
[00:14:12.765] Joseph Poon: Within the open source spaces, it is also a competitive function. Will I produce code with better social value? And there's that competitive dynamic and you saw it with the whole media library stuff on Linux, right? And in a bunch of other places, right? When you have this dynamic within the cryptocurrency space, it is essentially this threat of fork and the ease of forking is what encourages project developers and the project community, first and foremost, from ensuring that the project does do this wide distribution. Because really what these people are building are building social contracts. You are building these terms in which everybody on this network abides by. And some of those terms involve things like governance and things like ownership.
[00:15:00.994] Kent Bye: When you were talking about the no obligation, from a cryptocurrency sort of implementation, does that mean there's no smart contract or no contract? Or what does that mean to have no obligation, sort of no strings attached type of gift that is coming?
[00:15:14.582] Joseph Poon: So it's more about the governance process itself, right? If you wanted to attach a bounty system, and I would argue bounty systems don't work for open source, right? Because open source is about giving away code without any expectation of direct financial return. It makes more sense to give away financial return without any direct expectation of code. This structure makes more sense within that community. When you attach a bounty system, there's an inherent complexity when you apply that to a blockchain. It's because without some decentralized voting mechanism that works, and that might be possible, right? But right now, you're basically going to need a trusted authority to verify other people's code. And I would argue the general public of coin holders are not going to be able to do that. You're not going to be like, oh, whoever writes the most lines of code, right? As a consequence, you're going to need basically this ivory tower of individuals apportioning out value to open source developers. At that point, that looks a lot like a company in terms of what its social function is doing. Instead, it makes more sense to just get a list of people, distribute out value, whether they work or not, whether they contribute to the project or not, whether they take the coins and just dump it on the market or just give it away or whatever. That's up to them. You know, and that's the experiment that's sort of being run in the ecosystem right now with the whole airtrop and faucet mechanics.
[00:16:34.093] Kent Bye: When I was talking to Vint Cerf and talking about cryptocurrencies and Google has their sort of surveillance capitalism model in order to do a lot of public good of making access to all this information and knowledge that we all have for free. And the alternative is maybe sort of gating it with money. And, you know, I think that, you know, what I was saying is maybe the cryptocurrencies will be able to change the fundamental market dynamics. And he's like, no, I don't think so. I think that there are some universal market dynamics that all these cryptocurrencies are going to be just as susceptible to the power law dynamics of somebody kind of coming in and taking over with already having a lot of access to money. And so do you see that these types of approaches of the gifting of this are changing some of these fundamental market dynamics and that we're going to see perhaps new economic behaviors that we haven't been able to see before in a typical capitalistic system?
[00:17:22.345] Joseph Poon: So what we are seeing at the minimum is people that distribute out more value to various communities for free tend to be more successful. So we are explicitly seeing that. When it comes to the governance process, to be clear, all of this stuff is an experiment and we're very unsure and all of us are trying to do the right thing. But when it comes to the end state dynamics, We think it will go in this direction, but we're not sure, right? What we're seeing right now is that it is, though. Right now, you know, wider distribution of people tends to be game theoretically more successful. And this community is operating on purely mechanisms around self-interested incentives. You know, expecting people to be altruistic and do the right thing is one thing, and people can do that individually. But that sort of requires culture and monitoring, et cetera, et cetera. It's a lot easier when you can prove That you will make more money by giving away more of your money.
[00:18:21.052] Kent Bye: Well, I do a podcast so I give away information So I have that I call it a yen currency Which is that the more that I give away the more that I get so it's the young in the end where the yen is There's a competitive aspect but the yen aspect is that you know information love community all these things that you invest more time in you get more return. And so it seems like some of the virtualization of some of these blockchain are creating these similar dynamics by which that the more you give away, the more that you get, which to some extent people have felt that an open source of maybe on a level of personal meaning and purpose, but it hasn't always translated into financial gains or returns. But this sounds like it's getting a little bit more of the economic models behind that to be able to actually sustain it.
[00:18:59.343] Joseph Poon: Yeah, yeah. I think there's a reason why, you know, a lot of these projects are starting to just do that exact thing. And we'll see what happens when it comes to this. I think a lot of this is an experiment. Unfortunately, we have to do these experiments live is one function of the cryptocurrencies economy is simply because we can model things as much as possible. We can constrain the problem space by modeling it. But we can only go so far. The reason is because we're dealing with human incentives and human behavior. Once you start dealing with human incentives, unpredictability increases dramatically. You're dealing with social dynamics, group dynamics, and they're very, very complex. At a certain point, you have to run the experiments live. And right now, the goal of this community is to run as many experiments as soon as possible, while it's as cheap as possible. Because the fear is, as this ecosystem gets larger, the experiments will become more and more expensive over time. Just modeling stuff is sort of like playing poker with fake money. When you play poker with real money, the human dynamics changes dramatically. And as a consequence, everybody is modeling things, and this is one of those things that the ecosystem is modeling. And that's why coordination mechanisms and group dynamics and sort of collective action decisions are sort of the current area of research that's pretty interesting in this space.
[00:20:18.224] Kent Bye: So for you, what are some of the either biggest problems that you're trying to solve or open questions that you're trying to answer?
[00:20:25.197] Joseph Poon: Yeah, so the biggest open question right now in this space is around how to do group dynamics, and there's a lot of tests being run. How to resolve scalability, which is how do you make sure that everybody in the world can use these systems if it's supposed to benefit everyone kind of thing. And finally, there's this notion of peer-to-peer oracles and verification. How do you produce system that does give value to everybody because at that point you're touching the real world and when you touch the real world there needs to be some type of bridge and it tends to involve peer-to-peer oracles in a way to verify that someone actually is receiving funds for example or like everybody is receiving funds and that's a current ongoing and emerging area of research.
[00:21:10.500] Kent Bye: Great. And finally, what do you think is kind of the ultimate potential for all these decentralized systems and what it might be able to enable?
[00:21:21.219] Joseph Poon: A lot of this is about disrupting the nature of the firm itself. A lot of it is we abdicate control to centralized authorities because they need to exist for some reason. And if you did want to have decentralized systems replace them, you need to be understanding their role. And some of their roles is preventing Sybil attacks and things like that. So I think a lot of the ultimate potential is to remove the need for a lot of centralized authorities. And in the blockchain space in particular is around removing the need and disintermediating the notion of the corporation itself, especially the conglomerate. Those are the entities that you're going to see the biggest shift with if these projects tend to be successful. and hopefully eventually it'll become maybe an ecosystem where everybody has a stake in the mechanisms of society and can participate in it and can get the returns from it as well. That's only possible if the blockchain replaces industries one by one by one and some aspects go on the blockchain and there is this emergent game of distribution that can happen as a consequence.
[00:22:37.115] Kent Bye: OK, great. Awesome. Thank you so much for joining me today. So thank you. Thank you. So that was Joseph Poon. He's a researcher on scalability and the co-author of The Lightning Network and Plasma. And he's also looking into things like coordination mechanisms, group dynamics, and collective action decisions. So I have a number of different takeaways about this interview is that, first of all, The fact that at any moment someone within one of these blockchain communities can fork your code and then in essence kind of split the value off into a completely different trajectory is something that you can't do in the normal concrete world with a company with a board of directors and infrastructure and a CEO. So it's kind of like this open source project. So there's an incentive to try to figure things out and try to find things that are going to work for everybody. But if it comes to the point of needing a fork, then you do fork and you kind of split things off. But the dynamic of that is that it's trying to create a cooperation amongst all of these different companies where they are wanting to invest within open source technologies. I think trying to fund open source technology is something that has been one of the huge challenges. And a lot of the open source that gets developed these days is done by these huge centralized companies that are having people work full time on different things. And so the idea is just to kind of seed out a lot of the coins within these open source type of communities so that anybody that's contributing has some sort of stake in the game. So I was really interested in hearing about, you know, kind of these gift economy dynamics that I think are starting to potentially play out within the context of these cryptocurrencies. And it's encouraging because it's actually taking something that has been traditionally a zero-sum game and kind of changing the underlying dynamics of cooperation and trying to value the worth. I think that's, you know, one of the open questions is the oracle by which, you know, is that value actually being Delivered in some different ways and and the fact that all of this is just a grand experiment They don't really know and they they can't know they can't model it because there's only a certain limit by which you can Model, you know when it comes to human incentives and those decisions and how those play out in both the culture But also the market and so you just don't know what those incentive structures are going to be until you actually try it out and kind of learn as much as you can and But in talking to other people at the Decentralized Web Summit, one of the things about the blockchain is that it's giving so much more empirical data about people's values and how they're exchanging value with each other so that you can start to try to come up with more sophisticated models. But at the end of the day, you still have to kind of do it live. You can't just use mathematical models to be able to predict it because you can't mathematically model human consciousness and intentions and especially like group behaviors. And so he says it's like playing poker with like fake money. If you're gambling with fake money then there's no incentive for you to be cautious at all because it doesn't really matter at all. So it'll be interesting to see what Joseph does with some of his companies that is going to start to explore this in different ways. The other thing is this Sybil attacks. Sybil I think comes from a book about dissociative identity disorder where somebody has multiple personalities and as a metaphor it just is talking about if you just have bots and people basically overtaking a decentralized network. So if it's trying to be completely decentralized and have these different decisions that are being made, then a simple attack would be like, well, how do you subvert that type of process by just flooding the system with like fake accounts and spam bops and sock puppets and being able to kind of overtake a decentralized network? It's one of the big open questions. So how do you come up with the decentralized mechanisms to be able to do all that? So one of the big themes that I think came up over and over again was this interface between the four regulators of a society. And Lawrence Lessig talks about how there's the technology and the algorithms and the code that are running that that are driving behavior. there's the markets that are you know, basically the individual choices in a free market economy that is then coming up with economic behaviors and then there's the cultural patterns which is you know, the Values that are going to be reflected in different ways based upon what people are valuing and how they're spending their time and the different incentive structures and then finally the laws that are kind of governing everything and right now we tend to think about those from the context of a our legal system within our governments. But in a decentralized system, a lot of those rules and protocols and regulations are done by how do people come together and actually come up and make decisions together. And so those things of those coordination mechanisms and the group dynamics and the collective action, each of those are kind of addressing different things. So the technology is looking at the algorithms in the code. The relationship to the human incentives is talking about the market dynamics. The social dynamics is talking about the culture. And then the coordinating group dynamics is talking about the governance of how people are kind of organizing themselves. So there's lots of different people and communities that are doing lots of different experiments that are out there. And I think it's just going to be interesting to kind of track and see how this kind of plays out. But the fact that virtual reality is very similar to the blockchain in the sense that you have these virtual worlds and if it is completely decentralized and you can just kind of fork it and split it off, then there's going to be this issue of intellectual property. Something like Decentraland is something I'll be talking about a little bit. I'm not sure if they have the same type of dynamics because they have a single marketplace of mana where you're buying the land. And is it possible for you to take a copy of Decentraland and do something that's completely different with a different way of buying and selling land? And so I think it's an open question to see how far you can take this. Bernard Leite here has this concept of the yin currency and yang currency. And the yang currency is that zero-sum competition. And it's really designed to really refine something that's already been created. But in order to generate something from scratch, there's a lot more cooperation and collaboration. And this concept of a yin currency this yen currency is in some ways kind of additive. It's not as much of a zero sum. In other words, information could be interpreted as a form of yen currency in the sense that the more information that I give out as a podcaster, then the more that people want to talk to me because I've become this mediator of this different types of information. And so The same thing happens with community and love the more that you invest in the community the more invest in relationships then you can get returns on that in different ways and It's more additive rather than sort of a zero sum equation. And so the question is, you know, how far can you take this type of yen currency within the context of these open source communities where you're trying to add value to lots of people and redistribute and redistribute that wealth and that value amongst lots of people rather than consolidating that within the hands of just a few people. Now, whether or not that it's able to actually change a lot of these underlying fundamental market dynamics where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, that's yet to be seen. But it sounds like there's a lot of idealism that some of these concepts could theoretically start to do that. And that's part of the reason why they're doing these different experiments, just to see what actually happens. So that's all that I have for today. And I just wanted to thank you for listening to the Voices of VR podcast. And if you enjoy the podcast, so I'll be talking about a couple other cryptocurrencies, talk to someone with from ConsenSys, talking about Ethereum and Just some of these more cooperation dynamics that are happening within the larger ecosystem of the blockchain. This tends to be a theme that I see that's happening both within the blockchain communities, but to a certain extent this could happen within the context of virtual reality as well. There is a similar type of virtualization that's happening that could potentially use some of these similar types of dynamics, which is to say that the more that you create the virtual worlds and metaverses that are creating valuable experiences that people want to have, then you, again, are creating those network effects of Metcalfe's Law, which is the value of that network becomes increasing by the square of the nodes of the people that are involved in that network. And I'll be talking a little bit about Decentraland as well, kind of an update from them since it's about a year since I've talked to them. So that's all that I have for today. And I just wanted to thank you for listening to the Voices of VR podcast. And if you enjoy the podcast, then please do spread the word, tell your friends and consider becoming a member of the Patreon. This is a listener supported podcast. And so I do rely upon your donations in order to continue to bring you this coverage. So you can donate today at patreon.com slash Voices of VR. Thanks for listening.